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Abstract
We compare joint and common ownership of public goods in a repeated game. Under
common ownership an owners access to the public good cannot be restricted by other
owners while under joint ownership each owner has a veto power. We nd that common
ownership maximizes the punishment (in the relevant parameter range) while joint
ownership minimizes the gain from deviation. Common ownership is optimal when
the returns to investments are low consistent with a stylized fact.
JEL classication: D23, H41, L14, L33
Keywords: public goods, property rights, repeated games, common ownership,
joint ownership
1 Introduction
The celebrated research by Ostrom (1990) nds that repeated games provide powerful
insights about management of common pool resources such as grazing areas, forests
and irrigation systems. She demonstrates how common ownership has in many cases
outperformed both private and public ownership but in other cases ownership by
private rms or government has been successful. Her work is primarily based on case
studies. In this paper we take a step toward theoretical comparison of ownership
structures by analyzing the ownership of pure public goods in a repeated game.1
Property rights theory of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990)
 and its extension to public goods by Besley and Ghatak (2001)  is the natural
framework for analyzing the various ownership regimes. Baker, Gibbons and Murphy
(2002) and Halonen (2002) examine property rights theory in a repeated game for
the private goods case. Our contribution is to analyze the ownership of pure public
goods in a repeated game. Our analysis can be applied to provision of common
property regimes, for example maintaining an irrigation system (Ostrom, 1990, 31-32).
However, pure public goods model is not applicable to appropriation and potential
overuse of common property.
We consider two agents l and h who di¤er in their valuation for the public good, i;
where l < h. The agents make specic investments, yi; for example in maintaining
the public good. Our interest is in nding the ownership structure that supports
rst best investments for the lowest discount factor. In the main model we focus
on two shared ownership structures, joint ownership and common ownership, and
examine single ownership in an extension. Joint ownership has often been analyzed
1E.g. Benhabib and Radner (1992) show how tragedy of commons can be overcome in a repeated
game but they do not endogenize the ownership structure. E.g. Copeland and Taylor (2009) examine
the strength of property rights in a dynamic model but do not address who should be the owner.
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in the property rights framework.2 Under joint ownership the owners have to reach
a unanimous agreement for the project to go ahead. Therefore in the static game
the disagreement payo¤s are zero and in Nash bargaining the agents split the ex
post surplus 50:50 resulting in incentives of 1
2
(l + h) = c
0 (yi) ; where c0 (yi) is the
marginal cost of the investment. While common ownership, according to Ostrom and
Hess (2010), is an arrangement where an owners access to the public good cannot
be restricted by other owners (but access can be denied for non-owners). Common
ownership is a less familiar concept in the property rights framework.3 Under common
ownership there is nothing to bargain about ex post and static incentives are therefore
i = c
0 (yi) : Clearly the high-valuation agent invests more under common ownership
than under joint ownership while the low-valuation agent invests less. Equalizing the
incentives under joint ownership is then optimal if the cost function is very convex.
We nd that for investment cost function c (yi) = (yi)
 joint ownership is optimal in
the static game for  > 1:5:
In the repeated game the incentives depend on the one-shot gain from deviation
and on the long-term loss due to punishment for deviation. Joint ownership mini-
mizes the gain from deviation by equalizing the deviation payo¤s (which are convex in
surplus share). However, common ownership is optimal when the punishment e¤ect
is dominant. This is the case when investments are inelastic to surplus share ( > 2).
As it is di¢ cult to generate punishment, ownership is chosen to maximize punishment
power. Common ownership maximizes punishment as for such convex cost function
equalizing the investments would be optimal in the static game. When investments
2For example in Besley and Ghatak (2001), Halonen (2002), Cai (2003) and Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (2003). See Gattai and Natale (2016) for a survey on joint ownership in the property rights
theory.
3Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003) call a similar arrangement joint ownership with no veto right.
Niedermayer (2013) examines an open source platform where no one can be excluded from the public
good. Open source and common ownership are equivalent in a 2-agent setup.
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are elastic to surplus share ( < 2) ; minimizing the gain from deviation provides the
best incentives and joint ownership is optimal.
An alternative interpretation of our results is that common ownership is optimal
when the returns to investments in the public good are low ( > 2) and joint ownership
is optimal when the returns are high ( < 2) :4 Low returns to investments have been
identied as a stylized fact of common ownership such as the communal grazing lands
in the Swiss Alps (Netting, 1976, 1981, and Ostrom and Hess, 2010). A leading
example of joint ownership of a public good, research joint venture, has high returns
to investments consistent with our result.5
It is interesting to compare our results to the private goods case. In the static
game there is a stark contrast between private and public goods. In the private goods
case (Grossman and Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990, and Hart, 1995) ownership
is determined by technological factors such as the importance of investment. While
Besley and Ghatak (2001) show that for public goods ownership by the high-valuation
party provides better incentives than ownership by the low-valuation party irrespective
of the importance of investment. In the repeated game the results are more aligned.
Halonen (2002) nds that also in the private goods case maximizing punishment is op-
timal for  > 2 and minimizing the gain from deviation is optimal for  < 2: However,
there are important di¤erences. With private goods the optimal ownership structure
of the static game minimizes the gain from deviation while with public goods it is
joint ownership (even when it is not optimal in the static game).6 Furthermore, with
public goods the results of the static game, and therefore the punishment maximizing
4In an extension we show that these results hold (although with additional conditions) even when
we include single ownership in the analysis.
5See Caloghirou et al. (2003) for a survey on research joint ventures.
6Joint ownership minimizes the gain from deviation in our main model where we compare shared
ownership structures. Section 5 qualies this result when also single ownership is included in the
analysis.
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structure, depend on : This is not the case with the private goods. Also, joint
ownership has a di¤erent role: with public goods it minimizes the gain from deviation
while with private goods it maximizes the punishment. Despite these di¤erences, the
cut-o¤ value for  remains interestingly the same.
In the main model we apply trigger strategies. In an extension we examine rene-
gotiation by allowing the deviator to pay a monetary transfer to the other party to
restore ex post e¢ ciency.7 This modelling approach ts well in many common prop-
erty arrangements where o¤enders have to pay a ne (Ostrom, 1990, p. 98). We show
that, as in the private goods case of Blonski and Spagnolo (2007), renegotiation does
not change the optimal ownership structure because the monetary transfer is set so
high that all the gains from renegotiation go to the non-defecting party. Therefore the
continuation payo¤ for the deviating party is equal to his continuation payo¤ without
any renegotiation, that is his payo¤ with trigger strategy.
In this paper we extend the analysis of ownership of public goods by Besley and
Ghatak (2001) to a repeated game. Their work has also been extended to e.g. im-
pure public goods (Francesconi and Muthoo, 2011), indispensable agents (Halonen-
Akatwijuka, 2012), generalized Nash bargaining solution (Schmitz, 2013) and the lo-
cation of public good (Halonen-Akatwijuka and Palis, 2014). None of these papers
provide dynamic analysis.
Rosenkranz and Schmitz (2003) and Niedermayer (2013) also compare common
ownership and joint ownership (in addition to proprietary ownership) although they
use di¤erent terminology.8 In the private goods framework of Rosenkranz and Schmitz
(2003), joint ownership induces knowledge disclosure while common ownership pro-
7See e.g. Levin (2003) and Goldlücke and Kranz (2012) on repeated games with monetary transfers
and e.g. Doornik (2006) and Rayo (2007) on their applications in organizations.
8Our joint ownership is equivalent to joint ownership with bilateral veto power in Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (2003) and to standardized platform in Niedermayer (2013). See footnote 3 for common
ownership.
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vides good investment incentives. In Niedermayer (2013) there is a public good
(platform) but only one agent makes an investment in the public good. The agents
additionally invest in private goods (applications) complementary to the platform.
Common ownership provides good incentives to invest in the applications while un-
der joint ownership the investment in the platform internalizes some of the positive
externality on the second application. Neither paper analyzes a repeated game.
The incomplete contracting literature on privatization (e.g. Hart et al., 1997 and
Hoppe and Schmitz, 2010) and on public-private partnerships (e.g. Hart, 2003, Ben-
nett and Iossa, 2006, Martimort and Poyet, 2008, and Chen and Chiu, 2010) are
related. We di¤er in allowing also the private providers to be value driven and mod-
elling explicitly the public good nature of the projects. This literature does not
provide dynamic analysis either.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the static game
and Section 3 analyzes the repeated game. Section 4 compares the results of the
repeated game for public and private goods. Section 5 extends the analysis to single
ownership and Section 6 examines renegotiation. Section 7 concludes.
2 Static game
There are two players, l and h. Each agent makes a project-specic investment
denoted by yl and yh:9 Public good is produced and the benet from the project is
equal to (yl + yh): The players value the project di¤erently: the low-valuation agents
utility from the public good is l(yl + yh) and the high-valuation agents utility is
h(yl + yh) where l < h: Investment costs are given by c (yi) = (yi)
 for i = l; h
where  > 1:
9In the main model the investment can be in either human or physical capital. In Section 5 the
nature of the investment will matter.
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Joint surplus is equal to S = (l + h) (yl + yh)   c (yl)   c (yh) : The rst-best
investments are then given by the following rst-order conditions
(l + h) = c
0 (yi ) for i = l; h: (1)
We denote y  y1 = y2:
Contracts are incomplete. Therefore ex ante contracts can only be written on the
ownership of the public good. In the main model we focus on two types of shared
ownership, joint ownership and common ownership, and leave the analysis of single
ownership to Section 5. Under joint ownership a unanimous agreement by the owners
is required for the project to go ahead. Under common ownership, according to
Ostrom and Hess (2010), an owners access to the public good cannot be restricted by
other owners although access can be denied for non-owners.
The timing is the following:
Stage 1. l and h contract on the ownership of the project. We analyze joint
ownership and common ownership.
Stage 2. l and h invest in project-specic capital.
Stage 3. l and h bargain over the completion of the project and produce the public
good.
Under joint ownership the disagreement payo¤s are zero as each agent has veto
power. Therefore the agents split the ex post surplus 50:50 in Nash bargaining
leading to the following payo¤s
uJi =
1
2
(l + h) (yh + yl)  c (yi) for i = l; h (2)
where superscript J denotes joint ownership. Under joint ownership the incentives
are
6
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(l + h) = c
0  yJi  : (3)
We denote yJ  yJ1 = yJ2 :
Under common ownership neither consumption of the public good nor participation
in its production can be restricted for the owners. Therefore there is nothing to bargain
about in stage 3. The payo¤s are
uCi = i(yl + yh)  c (yi) i = l; h: (4)
Common ownership is denoted by superscript C. Optimal investments under common
ownership, denoted by yCi ; are given by
i = c
0  yCi  i = l; h: (5)
Equations (1) ; (3) and (5) show that yCl < y
J < yCh < y
: Proposition 1 compares
the joint surplus under common ownership and joint ownership.
Proposition 1 In the static game joint ownership dominates common ownership if
and only if  > 1:5.
All the proofs are in Appendix A.1.
Under joint ownership both agents have equal, intermediate incentives. While
under common ownership the high-valuation agent has strong incentives and the low-
valuation agent has weak incentives. Now if  is high enough, two intermediate
investments are more cost-e¤ective than one high and one low investment and joint
ownership is optimal.
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3 Repeated game
In a repeated game the agents can support the rst-best investments if they are suf-
ciently patient. Our interest is in nding the ownership structure that sustains the
rst-best investments for the greatest range of discount factors. In this Section we
focus on trigger strategies with reversion to the Nash equilibrium of the static game
as punishment. In Section 6 we introduce renegotiation.
The agents implicitly agree to make the e¢ cient investments, y, and agent h
agrees to pay l a transfer T  which is such that the incentive compatibility constraints
are satised. Cooperation is maintained as long as both agents follow the e¢ cient
behavior. Any deviation triggers punishment for the rest of the game.
First best will be supported if and only if the discounted payo¤stream from e¢ cient
behavior exceeds the payo¤ stream from deviation for both agents. The incentive
compatibility constraints are
1
1   [2hy
   T   c (y)]  P d;!h +

1  P
p;!
h (6)
1
1   [2ly
 + T   c (y)]  P d;!l +

1  P
p;!
l (7)
where  is the discount factor, P d;!i is is one-shot deviation payo¤ under ownership
structure ! and P p;!i is is payo¤ in the punishment path. P
p;!
i is obtained by
substituting the optimal investments of the static game (given by equation (3) or (5))
in agent is payo¤ function (equation (2) or (4)): P d;!i di¤ers from P
p;!
i in that yj = y

is substituted in.
The agents can nd a suitable T that satises both agentsincentive compatibil-
ity constraints as long as the aggregate incentive compatibility constraint is satised.
8
Summing up (6) and (7) we nd that rst-best investments can be sustained in equi-
librium if and only if
  G
!
G! + L!
 !: (8)
G! =

P d;!h + P
d;!
l   S

is the gain from deviation and L! = (S   Sp;!) is the loss
from deviation, where S is the rst-best joint surplus and Sp;! is the joint surplus in
the punishment path: If the discount factor is high enough, the one-shot gain from
deviation is outweighed by the long-term punishment. Our aim is to nd an ownership
structure which minimizes !:
It is useful to rst examine the gain and the loss from deviation.
Proposition 2 (i) The gain from deviation is lower under joint ownership than under
common ownership.
(ii) The loss from deviation is higher under joint ownership than under common
ownership if and only if  < 1:5:
Proposition 2(i) can be understood as follows. The deviation payo¤s under com-
mon ownership are
P d;Ch = h
 
y + yCh
  c  yCh  (9)
P d;Cl = l
 
yCl + y
  c  yCl  (10)
and under joint ownership
P d;Ji =
1
2
(l + h)
 
y + yJ
  c  yJ : (11)
There are two sources to the gain from deviation. The rst part comes from the ability
to expropriate from the other agents rst-best investment. Under joint ownership the
agents can expropriate half of the joint value of the other agents rst-best investment
9
(1
2
(l + h) y
 in equation (11)) while under common ownership they can expropriate
the full individual value (hy in equation (9) or ly in equation (10)). However,
adding these up amounts to (l + h) y under both ownership structures. Therefore
the di¤erence in the gain from deviation comes from the second source, the payo¤
earned from the agents own second-best investment. This can be seen from the
following equation (which is derived in the Appendix and does not depend on y).
GC  GJ = hyCh   c  yCh + lyCl   c  yCl   2 12 (l + h) yJ   c  yJ

(12)
When l = h the ownership structures are equivalent (see equations (3) and (5)) and
GC = GJ : Using the envelope theorem we can show that
@
 
GC  GJ
@h
= yCh   yJ > 0 (13)
and therefore GC > GJ for any l < h:
Agent is payo¤ from his own investment is yi  c (yi) ; where  denotes the share
of the value of his own investment that an agent obtains in bargaining. We can show
that this payo¤ is convex in :10 That is why equalizing the deviation payo¤s under
joint ownership minimizes them compared to a signicantly higher payo¤ for h and a
moderately lower payo¤ for l under common ownership.
Proposition 2(ii) is the mirror image of Proposition 1(ii). Since the joint surplus
is higher in the static game under common ownership for  < 1:5; joint ownership
maximizes the punishment in this parameter range.
Proposition 2 shows that for  < 1:5 joint ownership provides both the maximal
punishment and the minimal gain from deviation. Then joint ownership provides
better incentives for cooperation unambiguously. While for higher values of  there is
10yi   c (yi) =  (=)1=( 1)   (=)=( 1) = (   1) (=)=( 1) :
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a trade-o¤: joint ownership minimizes the gain but also minimizes the punishment.
Proposition 3 In the repeated game common ownership dominates joint ownership
if and only if  > 2:
Proposition 3 shows that common ownership is optimal for  > 2: In this parameter
range common ownership maximizes the punishment although that comes at the cost
of maximal gain from deviation. The results depend on the elasticity of investment
to surplus share. This elasticity determines how much the surplus drops along the
punishment path and is equal to 1=(   1):11 Therefore the investment is inelastic
(elastic) when  > 2 ( < 2). When the investment is inelastic, the surplus does not
fall much after deviation. Then the ownership structure has to be chosen to maximize
the punishment and common ownership is optimal. When the investment is elastic,
either ownership structure provides enough punishment power and minimizing the gain
from deviation provides the best incentives for cooperation. Then joint ownership is
optimal. We will discuss the relationship of these results to the private goods case of
Halonen (2002) in Section 4.
We can also compare the emergence of joint ownership in the static and in the
repeated game. In the static game joint ownership dominates when equalizing the
agentsinvestments is cost-e¤ective ( > 1:5). In the repeated game joint ownership
emerges when it is optimal to minimize the gain from deviation by equalizing the de-
viation payo¤s ( < 2). Interestingly, the parameter ranges are partially overlapping
and for 1:5 <  < 2 joint ownership is optimal both in the static and in the repeated
game.
We have shown that common ownership is optimal when the investments are
inelastic to surplus share. Alternatively, we can say that there are low returns to
11Agents optimal investment in the static game is y = (=)1=( 1) : The elasticity of investment
to surplus share is given by (@y=@) (=y) = 1= (   1) :
11
investments when  > 2: Low returns to investments have been identied as a stylized
fact of common ownership (Netting, 1976, 1981, and Ostrom and Hess, 2010). An
example is the use of Alpine hillsides for communal grazing lands in Switzerland.
Joint ownership is optimal when the investments are productive ( < 2) : Horizontal
research joint venture (RJV) is a leading example of joint ownership of a public good.12
Returns to investments are high(er) consistent with our result.13
4 Public vs. private goods
In this section we compare the results of the repeated game for public and private
goods, the latter analyzed in Halonen (2002). Interestingly, the results of the private
goods case also depend on whether  is greater or smaller than 2. However, there are
several di¤erences in the e¤ects.
With private goods the optimal ownership structure of the static game provides the
best incentives when  < 2 because it minimizes the gain from deviation. While for
 > 2 the worst ownership structure of the static game (joint ownership in the private
goods case) is optimal because the punishment is maximized. With public goods the
results no longer depend on the tradeo¤ between the best and the worst ownership
structure of the static game. However, minimizing the gain from deviation continues
to be optimal when the investments are elastic. But now joint ownership minimizes
the gain from deviation even when it is not optimal in the static game. Similarly,
maximizing the punishment is optimal when the investments are inelastic. But now
also the results of the static game depend on  and that gives a new twist. In this
parameter range common ownership provides the largest punishment because for large
12In a horizontal RJV any innovation becomes a public good for the partners. While a private
good model is appropriate for a vertical RJV where an inventor and a developer cooperate and only
the developer can commercialize the innovation.
13See e.g. Hagedoorn (1996) and (2002) for evidence.
12
 equalizing investments by joint ownership is cost-e¢ cient in the static game.
Note also that joint ownership has a di¤erent role depending on the nature of goods.
Joint ownership minimizes the gain from deviation with public goods and maximizes
the punishment with private goods.14 The nal di¤erence is that in the private
goods case there is always a trade-o¤between maximizing punishment and minimizing
the gain from deviation. With public goods there is a parameter range for which
joint ownership provides both minimal gain and maximal punishment. Despite these
di¤erences, the cut-o¤ value for  is the same. This is particularly interesting as the
results of the static game di¤er signicantly. In the private goods case (Grossman and
Hart, 1986, Hart and Moore, 1990, Hart, 1995) it is optimal to concentrate ownership
in the hands of the agent with an important investment. To the contrary, Besley and
Ghatak (2001) show that the high-valuation agent should own the public good even
when only the low-valuation agent has an investment.
We can now continue the common ownership example of Alpine grazing lands.
More productive agricultural lands in the mountain valleys are privately owned, that
is private goods (Netting 1976, 1981). Our model takes it as given that the good
is public and derives the optimal owner for the public good. However, land can
remain as a public good or can be fenced to be a private good. According to Halonen
(2002) single ownership is optimal for private goods when  < 2: Private ownership
of productive agricultural lands is therefore consistent with this result.
5 Single ownership
In the main model we compared ownership structures with two owners. We now
examine an ownership structure where either agent l or agent h is the single owner.
14Therefore our results of the public goods case are opposite to the private goods case where joint
ownership is optimal for  > 2:
13
We assume that under single ownership, if bargaining breaks down and the agents
cannot collaborate, proportion  of the non-owners investment remains in the project,
where 0    1. Therefore agent ks disagreement payo¤ under ownership by i is
k (yi + yj) ; where k; i; j = l; h and i 6= j.15
Nash bargaining payo¤s under ownership by agent i are
uii = i (yj + yi) +
1
2
(l + h) (1  ) yj   c (yi)
=
1
2
(l + h) (yi + yj) +
1
2
(i   j) (yi + yj)  c (yi) ; (14)
uij =
1
2
(l + h) (yi + yj) +
1
2
(j   i) (yi + yj)  c (yj) : (15)
The rst term in (14) and (15) shows the holdup problem. The second term arises
from the default payo¤s. Agent hs higher valuation for the public good implies that
his default payo¤ is larger improving his relative bargaining position. That is why
the second term is positive for agent h and negative for agent l.
Investment incentives in the static game are
i = c
0  yii ; (16)
1
2
(l + h) +
1
2
(j   i) = c0
 
yij

: (17)
Note that common ownership is formally equivalent to single ownership with  = 1:
In both cases both agentsinvestments fully contribute to the value of the project even
15Now, unlike in the main model, it becomes important whether the investment is in physical or
human capital. Investment in physical capital remains in the project if the investing agent leaves
and  = 1: Investment in human capital is embedded in the person although some of it may spill
over to the project and 0    1.
14
under disagreement either because the access of common owners cannot be restricted
or because the non-owners investment is fully sunk in the project.
It follows from (3), (5), (16) and (17) that for 0   < 1
yCl = y
l
l < y
h
l  yJ < y; (18)
yJ  ylh < yCh = yhh < y: (19)
Equations (18) and (19) rstly replicate the main result of Besley and Ghatak (2001):
h-ownership provides better incentives for both agents than l-ownership. Secondly,
h-ownership dominates common ownership and a repeated game is needed to provide
a rationale for common ownership.16
As previously, let us proceed to analyze the gain and loss from deviation.
Proposition 4 Assume  < 1:
(i) max

GJ ; Gh
	
< GC < Gl;
(ii) max

LJ ; Lh
	
< LC < Ll if and only if  > 1:5:
(iii) Lh < LC < min

LJ ; Ll
	
if and only if  < 1:5:
Proposition 4 shows that there are broadly two classes of ownership structures.
First, the ownership structures that can be optimal in the static game joint own-
ership and h-ownership minimize the gain from deviation. Second, the ownership
structures that are dominated in the static game common ownership and l-ownership
maximize the punishment in the parameter range where the punishment e¤ect is im-
portant. In line with the previous results, we will show that common ownership or
l-ownership is optimal if  > 2 while joint ownership or h-ownership is optimal if  < 2:
16It is easy to show that joint ownership is optimal in the static game if and only if  > 1:5 and
  e; where 0 < e < 1; and h-ownership is optimal otherwise.
15
Proposition 4 also shows that joint ownership still provides both large punishment and
small gain from deviation if  < 1:5:
Proposition 5 derives the optimal ownership structure.
Proposition 5 In the repeated game
(i) joint ownership is optimal if  < 2 and ! 1;
(ii) ownership by the high-valuation agent is optimal if  < 2 and ! 0;
(iii) common ownership is optimal if  > 2 and l
h
! 0 and
(iv) ownership by the low-valuation agent is optimal if  > 2; l
h
! 1 and ! 0:
Proposition 5 shows that also single ownership can emerge as optimal in the re-
peated game. In the parameter range where the gain e¤ect is important ( < 2), h-
ownership is optimal for small  because it minimizes the gain from deviation. Agent
hs deviation payo¤ under h-ownership is
P d;hh =
1
2
(h + l)
 
yhh + y
+ 1
2
(h   l)
 
yhh + y
  c  yhh : (20)
When agent ls rst best investment is largely embedded in himself (! 0), hs ability
to extract from it is limited.17 While for high values of  the gain from deviation
under joint ownership (which does not depend on ) is lower than the gain under
h-ownership (which is increasing in ) and joint ownership is optimal.
In the parameter range where the punishment e¤ect is dominant ( > 2) ; ownership
by the low-valuation agent can be optimal but only if l is not too low compared to h:
Here the e¤ects are more subtle as the optimal ownership structure does not simply
maximize the punishment (Ll > LC and Gl > GC for all parameter values). The
17Note that for agent l there is the opposite e¤ect

@P d;hl =@ < 0

but it is of a smaller magnitude
so that @Gh=@ > 0 (as veried by equation (50)):
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di¤erence between agent ls punishment payo¤s is equal to
P p;ll   P p;Cl =
1
2
[(h + l) + (l   h)] ylh   lyCh :
(Remember that yll = y
C
l .) @

P p;ll   P p;Cl

=@l < 0 and therefore lower l decreases
ls punishment payo¤more under common ownership than under l-ownership. There-
fore the loss from deviation increases more under common ownership when l
h
! 0
and common ownership is optimal. While l-ownership emerges as optimal when the
(marginal) gain e¤ect is dominant. The di¤erence between agent ls deviation payo¤s
is equal to
P d;ll   P d;Cl =
1
2
(h   l) (1  ) y:
@

P d;ll   P d;Cl

=@l < 0 and therefore higher l increases ls deviation payo¤ and
the aggregate gain from deviation  more under common ownership favouring l-
ownership.18 That is why l-ownership is optimal for l
h
! 1:
Figure 1 presents simulation results which show that the results of Proposition 5
hold also for intermediate values of  and l
h
:19 For  < 2 h-ownership is optimal for
low values of  and joint ownership for high values of : While for  > 2 the optimal
ownership structure is common ownership for low values of l
h
and l-ownership for high
values of l
h
:20
18Note also that @2

P p;ll   P p;Cl

=@ (l)
2
> 0 and @2

P d;ll   P d;Cl

=@ (l)
2
< 0 which explains
why the marginal loss e¤ect is dominant for low l and the marginal gain e¤ect is dominant for high
l:
19Figure 1(a) is drawn for small lh so that common ownership is optimal for all  if  > 2: Figure
1(b) is drawn for small  so that h-ownership is optimal for all lh if  < 2:
20Simulation results also show that ! 0 is not a necessary condition for l-ownership to be optimal
(Proposition 5(iv)).
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Even when we include single ownership in the analysis, common ownership con-
tinues to be optimal in the relevant case of low returns to investments as long as
the agentsvaluations of the public good are not too homogeneous. The additional
condition requires further discussion. In the empirical literature there is no consensus
on the role of heterogeneity in the management of common-pool resources (see e.g.
Poteete and Ostrom, 2004, and Ruttan, 2006, 2008). Di¤erent types of heterogene-
ity can have di¤erent e¤ects. For example, economic inequality may have a positive
e¤ect21 while socio-cultural heterogeneity has a more negative e¤ect. In our model
the agents di¤er only in the valuation of the public good. The valuation di¤erence
can arise from economic inequality (e.g. the value of irrigation system depends on
21See also Baland and Platteau (2003) for theoretical analysis where the e¤ect of income inequality
depends on the model setup.
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the agents land endowment)22 and therefore our result is not inconsistent with the
empirical results.23
Joint ownership also remains optimal for high returns to investments. The ad-
ditional requirement is that the investments are largely sunk in the project.24 This
matches well with R&D since innovation can typically be commercialized without the
presence of the other party.
6 Renegotiation
We have applied trigger strategies and assumed that the ownership structure cannot be
renegotiated in the punishment path. We will now introduce renegotiation and allow
the deviator to pay a monetary transfer to the other agent to restore cooperation. This
is a natural way to model renegotiation as in many common property arrangements
o¤enders pay a ne (Ostrom, 1990, p. 98).25 Our analysis draws on Blonski and
Spagnolo (2007) who examine renegotiation in the private goods case. In what follows,
we show that our results are robust to introducing renegotiation and nes.
The agentsstrategies are the following.
Phase 1: invest y and pay (or receive) T : If agent i deviates, start Phase 2.
Phase 2:
Agent j 6= i : If agent i pays transfer F i;! at the beginning of the period, go back
to Phase 1.
22Also cultural view of the resource can a¤ect its valuation. However, cultural di¤erences also
a¤ect importantly the process of building trust.
23Note also that the empirical literature focuses mainly on appropriation while we analyse provision
of common property regimes.
24Note that this internalspillover is di¤erent from R&D spillover which usually refers to unin-
tended leaking of knowledge to rivals.
25Fines are often graduated. First-time o¤enders may pay an insignicant ne but for repeat
o¤enders the punishment gradually increases all the way to banishment (Ostrom, 1990, p. 98.) Our
analysis focuses on the maximal ne.
19
Otherwise, choose y!j and start Phase 2 in the next period.
Agent i : Pay F i;! to agent j and go back to Phase 1.
If any player deviates in Phase 2, re-start Phase 2 against that player.
After deviating in investment, agent i can restore cooperation by paying a transfer
F i;! to agent j at the beginning of the following period. If agent i does not pay
F i;!, then agent j will choose punishment investment y!j in that period. We take
the position that the agents would not engage in punishing the deviator by lower
investment than the optimal investment of the static game, y!j ; as that would harm
the public good.26 (In Appendix A.2 we examine lower punishment investments.27)
Suppose agent h has deviated. The incentive compatibility constraint for paying
the transfer F h;! is
 F h;!+ 1
1   [2hy
   c (y)  T ]  P p;!h +

 F h;! + 1
1   [2hy
   c (y)  T ]

:
(21)
If agent h pays F h;!; cooperation is restored immediately. Otherwise, agent h earns
his static payo¤ P p;!h and, using the one-shot deviation principle, the restoration of
cooperation is postponed by one period. From equation (21) we can solve for the
maximum transfer that agent h would be willing to pay and we set F h;! at its maximum
value.
F h;! =
[2hy
   c (y)  T ]  P p;!h
(1  ) (22)
In a similar manner we can derive F l;!:
F l;! =
[2ly
   c (y) + T ]  P p;!l
(1  ) (23)
26For example if the investment is in maintaining the public good, a very low punishment investment
could irreversibly damage the public good.
27In the Appendix we show that if it is reasonable to assume that the agents punish by zero
investments, then joint ownership is optimal.
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The incentive compatibility constraints for investing y are now
1
1   [2hy
   c (y)  T ]  P d;!h + 

 F h;! + 1
1   [2hy
   c (y)  T ]

; (24)
1
1   [2ly
   c (y) + T ]  P d;!l + 

 F l;! + 1
1   [2ly
   c (y) + T ]

: (25)
Summing up equations (24) and (25) we obtain the aggregate incentive compatibility
constraint

 
F h;! + F l;!
  P d;!h + P d;!l   S: (26)
And nally substituting equations (22) and (23) in (26) we obtain the critical discount
factor
  P
d;!
h + P
d;!
l   S
P d;!h + P
d;!
l   Sp;!
: (27)
Equation (27) is equivalent to equation (8) and therefore introducing renegotiation
does not change our previous results. This is because all the surplus from renegotiation
goes to the non-defecting party. Therefore the deviators continuation payo¤ is equal
to his continuation payo¤without renegotiation, that is his payo¤with trigger strategy.
Note also that renegotiation of ownership structure after deviation is not optimal since
the payment of the transfer restores ex post e¢ ciency.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have focused on shared ownership of public goods, in particular com-
mon ownership. In the property rights theory common ownership cannot be optimal in
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the static game28 while our repeated game can provide a rationale for it. Insights from
repeated games have indeed been used to understand successful management of com-
mon pool resources (Ostrom, 1990). Common ownership is, however, not a panacea
and therefore we need to compare it to other ownership structures. To the best of
our knowledge, this has not been done previously in a repeated game. We nd that
common ownership, as compared to joint ownership, has the benet of maximizing
the punishment (in the relevant parameter range) but it comes at the cost of maxi-
mizing the gain from deviation. Common ownership is optimal if the investments in
the public good are inelastic to surplus share. Alternatively, we can say that common
ownership is optimal if the returns to investments are low which is consistent with a
stylized fact. In our analysis the optimal ownership structure sustains the rst-best
investments for the lowest discount factor. It is further interesting that the critical
discount factor is the lowest exactly when common ownership is optimal ( < 1=2 if
and only if  > 2)29.
Our analysis of pure public goods applies to provision of common property regimes.
An important direction for future work is to extend the analysis to common pool re-
sources which are similar to pure public goods in the di¢ culty of excluding beneciaries
but di¤er in the possibility of overuse.
28Common ownership is dominated by h-ownership in the static game. In Niedermayer (2013)
common ownership can be optimal in the static game but the model setup is specic to platforms.
Common ownership gives the worst incentives for investing in the public good (platform) but can
be optimal because of its e¤ect on the investments in the (private) applications. In Rosenkranz and
Schmitz (2003) common ownership can be optimal in a 2-stage game but their model is essentially
a private goods model where each agent invests in their own project but there can be knowledge
spillovers.
29This holds for all the ownership structures according to simulations.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proofs
Firstly we give the explicit forms of the investments derived from (1) ; (3) and (5).
y =

l + h

 1
 1
(28)
yJ =

l + h
2
 1
 1
(29)
yCl =

l

 1
 1
(30)
yCh =

h

 1
 1
(31)
Proof of Proposition 1.
Joint surplus under joint ownership is larger than under common ownership if and
only if
2 (l + h) y
J   2c  yJ > (l + h)  yCl + yCh   c  yCl   c  yCh  : (32)
Dene h = l; where  > 1: Substituting this denition and equations (29)  (31)
in (32) we obtain
2 ( + 1) l

( + 1) l
2
 1
 1
  2

( + 1) l
2
 
 1
>
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( + 1) l
"
l

 1
 1
+

l

 1
 1
#
 

l

 
 1
 

l

 
 1
which is equivalent to
2 ( + 1)

 + 1
2
 1
 1
  2

 + 1
2
 
 1
>
( + 1)
"


 1
 1
+

1

 1
 1
#
 



 
 1
 

1

 
 1
: (33)
In Supplementary Appendix 1.1 we show that (33) is equivalent to
 s (; ) > s (; )
where
 s (; ) =
2   1


1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)

 1   ( + 1) 1 1 + 1



 1 ;
s (; ) = ( + 1) 
1

:
Subscript s denotes static game.
Di¤erentiating  s (; ) with respect to  gives
@ s (; )
@
=
2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)
1
 1    1 1   1
   1
2 
 1 :
Note that  s (1; ) = s (1; ) =
2 1

and @ s(;)
@
j=1 = @s(;)@ j=1 = 1. Since
 s (; ) and s (; ) are tangent at  = 1 and s (; ) is linear and increasing in
,  s (; )  s (; ) if @2 s (; ) =@2 > 0. The rest of the proof establishes that
@2 s (; ) =@
2 > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 1:5:
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@2 s (; )
@2
=
1
   1
"
2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)
2 
 1    2  1   2  
   1
3 2
 1
#
Multiply by (   1) = 2  1 and denote the expression by 's (; ) :
's (; ) =
2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1

 + 1

 2 
 1
  2  
   1
 1   1 (34)
In what follows we will prove that 's (; ) > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 1:5:
(Note that 's (; 1:5) = 0 and 's (; 2) =
1
2
.)
Substitute  = 1 in equation (34) :
's (1; ) =
2   1
2 (   1)  
2  
   1   1
It is straightforward to show that 's (1; ) > 0 if and only if  > 1:5. Furthermore,
lim!1 's (; ) =
2 1
 1
 
1
2
 1
 1 1 > 0 if and only if  > 1:5 (proved in Supplementary
Appendix 1.2).
Now di¤erentiate 's (; ) with respect to :
@'s (; )
@
=
2  
(   1)2
"
1  2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1

 + 1

 3 2
 1
#
(35)
Denote the term in the square brackets by s (; ) : Note that s (1; ) = 1  2 14( 1) >
0; lim!1 s (; ) = 1 2 1 1
 
1
2
 1
 1 < 0 and @s (; ) =@ =
(2 1)(3 2)
( 1)22
 
1
2
 1
 1
 
+1

 4 3
 1 <
0 if and only if  > 1:5. Therefore there exists a unique e > 1 for which s (e; ) = 0:
This implies that @'s (; ) =@ j=e = 0:
We have shown that 's (1; ) > 0 and lim!1 's (; ) > 0 if and only if  > 1:5:
Therefore if also 's (e; ) > 0 if and only if  > 1:5; the proof is complete.
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By denition
2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1
e + 1e
 3 2
 1
= 1 (36)
Substitute e in (34) and use (36) :
's (e; ) = 2   1   1

1
2
 1
 1
e + 1e
 2 
 1
  2  
   1e 1   1
=
"
2   1
   1

1
2
 1
 1
e + 1e
 3 2
 1
#e + 1e

  2  
   1e 1   1
=
e + 1e   2     1e 1   1
=
2   3e (   1) > 0 if and only if  > 1:5
This proves that 's (; ) > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 1:5. Therefore
@2 s (; ) =@
2 > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 1:5. Accordingly, joint ownership
dominates common ownership if and only if  > 1:5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
(i) The aggregate gain from deviation under common ownership is equal to
GC =

h
 
y + yCh
  c  yCh + l  y + yCl   c  yCl   [2 (l + h) y   2c (y)]
=

hy
C
h   c
 
yCh
  [hy   c (y)] + lyCl   c  yCl   [ly   c (y)] > 0:
GC > 0 since yCh maximizes the rst term in square brackets and y
C
l maximizes the
third term.
In the same way we can derive the aggregate gain from deviation under joint
ownership.
GJ = 2

1
2
(l + h) y
J   c  yJ  2 1
2
(l + h) y
   c (y)

> 0 (37)
26
Therefore the di¤erence in the gains is equal to
GC  GJ = hyCh   c  yCh + lyCl   c  yCl   2 12 (l + h) yJ   c  yJ

:
Equation (13) in Section 3 proves that GJ < GC for any h > l:
(ii) Proposition 1 shows that Sp;J > Sp;C if and only if  > 1:5 and therefore
LJ < LC if and only if  > 1:5. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3.
To derive the explicit form of J we rst substitute (28) and (29) in (37) obtaining
GJ = 2
"
1
2
(l + h)

l + h
2
 1
 1
 

l + h
2
 
 1
#
 2
"
1
2
(l + h)

l + h

 1
 1
 

l + h

 
 1
#
=

l + h

 
 1
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
> 0: (38)
(38) is positive by equation (37).
GJ + LJ equals
GJ + LJ = 2

1
2
(l + h) y
J   c  yJ  2 1
2
(l + h) y
   c (y)

+2 [(l + h) y
   c (y)]  2 (l + h) yJ   c  yJ
= (l + h)
 
y   yJ
= (l + h)
"
l + h

 1
 1
 

l + h
2
 1
 1
#
=

1

 1
 1
(l + h)

 1
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
: (39)
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Using equations (38) and (39) we obtain
J =
GJ
GJ + LJ
=
(   1)  1
2
 1
 1   (   2)

h
1   1
2
 1
 1
i : (40)
Similarly, GC and GC + LC equal
GC =
"
h

h

 1
 1
 

h

 
 1
#
+
"
l

l

 1
 1
 

l

 
 1
#
 
"
(l + h)

l + h

 1
 1
  2

l + h

 
 1
#
= (   1)

h

 
 1
+ (   1)

l

 
 1
  (   2)

l + h

 
 1
=

h

 
 1 h
(   1) + (   1)  1   (   2) ( + 1)  1
i
(41)
GC + LC =

hy
C
h   c
 
yCh

+

ly
C
l   c
 
yCl
  [(l + h) y   2c (y)]
+ [(l + h) 2y
   2c (y)]  h  yCh + yCl   c  yCh   l  yCh + yCl   c  yCl 
= h
 
y   yCl

+ l
 
y   yCh

= h
"
l + h

 1
 1
 

l

 1
 1
#
+ l
"
l + h

 1
 1
 

h

 1
 1
#
= (h)

 1

1

 1
 1 h
( + 1)
1
 1    1 1

+ 

( + 1)
1
 1   1
i
(42)
We have substituted in h = l where  > 1: Using equations (41) and (42) we
obtain
C =
(   1) + (   1)  1   (   2) ( + 1)  1

h
( + 1)
1
 1    1 1

+ 

( + 1)
1
 1   1
i : (43)
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In Supplementary Appendix 2.1 we establish that
J > C , r (; ) <  r (; )
where
r (; ) = (   1)
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
+ 
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
;
 r (; ) =

1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)

 1   (   1)  1
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
  1 1
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
:
Subscript r denotes repeated game. Di¤erentiating with respect to  gives
@r (; )
@
=
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
> 0 (44)
@ r (; )
@
=

   1

1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)
1
 1    1 1
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
  1
   1
2 
 1
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
Note that (44) is positive by equation (38).
Note that r (1; ) =  r (1; ) = 1 and
@r(;)
@
j=1 = @ r(;)@ j=1 =
h
(   1)  1
2
 1
 1 + (2  )
i
.
Since r (; ) and  r (; ) are tangent at  = 1 and r (; ) is linear and increasing
in ;  r (; )  r (; ) if @ 2r (; ) =@2 > 0. The rest of the proof establishes
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that @2 r (; ) =@
2 > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 2:
@2 r (; )
@2
=
1
   1
(

   1

1
2
 1
 1
( + 1)
2 
 1    2  1
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
 2  
   1
3 2
 1
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#)
:
Multiply by (   1) = 2  1 and denote the expression by 'r (; ) :
'r (; ) = 
 1
(

   1

1
2
 1
 1

 + 1

 2 
 1
  
"
1 

1
2
 1
 1
#
 2  
   1
"
(   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#)
(45)
In Supplementary Appendix 2.2 and 2.3 we prove that 'r (1; ) > 0 and lim!1 'r (; ) =

h

 1
 
1
2
 1
 1   1
i
> 0 if and only if  > 2:
Di¤erentiate 'r (; ) with respect to :
@'r (; )
@
=
2  
   1
 2
"
  
   1

1
2
 1
 1

 + 1

 3 2
 1
+ (   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2)
#
(46)
Denote the term in the square brackets by r(; ): Since    1
 
1
2
 1
 1
 
+1

 3 2
 1 < 0
and (   1)  1
2
 1
 1  (   2) > 0; for a given  there exists a unique b (not necessarily
greater than 1) for which r(b; ) = 0:30 Furthermore,
r(1; ) =   
4 (   1) + (   1)

1
2
 1
 1
  (   2) > 0 if and only if  > 2 (47)
30Note that b is not dened for  = 1:5:
30
This is proved in Supplementary Appendix 2.2: (Note that equation (47) is equivalent
to equation (A.2) in the Supplementary Appendix.) Di¤erentiate r(; ) with respect
to :
@r (; )
@
=
 (3  2)
2 (   1)2

 + 1

 4 3
 1

1
2
 1
 1
> 0 if and only if  < 1:5 (48)
Equations (47) and (48) determine the sign of r(; ) as in the rst column of Table
1.
r(; )
@'r(;)
@
'r (; )
 < 1:5 + if and only if  > b + if and only if  > b  
1:5 <  < 2      
 > 2   if and only if  > b + if and only if  > b +
Table 1
The sign of @'r(;)
@
depends on the sign of r(; ) as per equation (46) and it is
given in the second column of Table 1. Taking into account that 'r (1; ) < 0 and
lim!1 'r (; ) < 0 if and only if  < 2 we can determine that 'r (; ) < 0 for  < 2
: In Supplementary Appendix 2.4 we prove that 'r (; ) > 0 if  > 2:
This proves that 'r (; ) > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 2. Therefore
@2 r (; ) =@
2 > 0 for any  > 1 if and only if  > 2. Accordingly, C < J if and
only if  > 2: Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 4.
(i) The gain from deviation under ownership by agent i is equal to
Gi =
1
2
(l + h)
 
yii + y
+ 1
2
(i   j)
 
yii + y
  c  yii+ 12 (l + h)  y + yij
+
1
2
(j   i)
 
y + yij
  c  yij  2 (l + h) y + 2c (y)
=

iy
i
i   c
 
yii
  [iy   c (y)]
+

1
2
(l + h) y
i
j +
1
2
(j   i)yij   c
 
yij

(49)
 

1
2
(l + h) y
 +
1
2
(j   i)y   c (y)

Using the envelope theorem and taking into account that @y=@ = 0; we obtain
@Gh
@
=
1
2
(l   h)
 
yhl   y

> 0 (50)
@Gl
@
=
1
2
(h   l)
 
ylh   y

< 0: (51)
Since Gh = Gl = GC for  = 1; equations (50) and (51) prove that Gh < GC < Gl for
any  < 1: According to Proposition 2 GJ < GC : Therefore max

GJ ; Gh
	
< GC <
Gl:
(ii)  (iii) Equations (18) and (19) prove that Lh < LC < Ll: Proposition 1 proves
that LC < LJ if and only if  < 1:5 proving the statements in the Proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5.
(i) According to Proposition 3 J < C if and only if  < 2: According to equations
(14)  (17) C = h = l if  = 1: Therefore for  = 1 J < min  C ; h; l if  < 2:
By continuity the same holds for ! 1:
(ii) In Supplementary Appendix 3.5 we prove that for  = 0 h < J < l if and
only if  < 2: According to Proposition 3 J < C if and only if  < 2: Therefore
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for  = 0 h < min
 
C ; J ; l

if and only if  < 2: By continuity the same holds for
! 0:
(iii) According to Proposition 3 C < J if and only if  > 2: In Supplementary
Appendix 3.6 we prove that C  min  h; l if  > 2 and l
h
! 0: Therefore
C  min  J ; h; l if  > 2 and l
h
! 0:
(iv) In Supplementary Appendix 3.5 we prove that for  = 0 l < J < h if
and only if  > 2: According to Proposition 3 C < J if and only if  > 2: In
Supplementary Appendix 3.7 we prove that l < C if  > 2; l
h
! 1 and  ! 0:
Therefore l < min
 
J ; C ; h

if  > 2; l
h
! 1 and ! 0: Q.E.D.
A.2 Lower punishment investments
Denote the punishment investment by ypi : If the agents are willing to engage in punish-
ing by lower investments than the optimal investments of the static game (ypi < y
!
i ) ;
rst-best investments can be sustained for lower discount factors than in Section 6.
The maximum transfers are now
F h;! + F l;! =
S   P !h (y!h ; ypl )  P !l (y!l ; yph)
(1  ) (52)
where P !j
 
y!j ; y
p
i

is agent js payo¤ when he chooses y!j and agent i chooses punish-
ment investment ypi : y
p
i has to be incentive compatible as determined by
P !i
 
ypi ; y
!
j

+ 

F j;! +
1
1  P

i (y
; y)

 P !i
 
y!i ; y
!
j

+ 

 F i;! + 1
1  P

i (y
; y)

(53)
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where P i (y
; y) is agent is payo¤ under cooperation. Equation (53) simplies to

 
F h;! + F l;!
  P !i  y!i ; y!j   P !i  ypi ; y!j  : (54)
Equation (54) clearly holds for ypi = y
!
i : Now consider lower y
p
i : The gain from
deviating from ypi increases for lower y
p
i since @P
!
i
 
ypi ; y
!
j

=@ypi > 0 for y
p
i 2 [0; y!i ) :
However, also the left-hand-side of (54) increases since harsher punishment investment
increases the maximum transfers, @F j;!=@ypi < 0: Under joint ownership the e¤ect of
lower ypi is determined by

@
 
F h;J + F l;J

@ypi
+
@P Ji
 
ypi ; y
J

@ypi
=  
1
2
(l + h)
(1  ) +
1
2
(l + h)  c0 (ypi )
=
1
(1  )

(1  2) 1
2
(l + h)  (1  ) c0 (ypi )

(55)
For any   1=2 the transfer e¤ect dominates and (55) is negative. Therefore all
ypi 2

0; yJ

are incentive compatible. Similarly, we can verify that for any   1=2
all ypi 2

0; yCi

are incentive compatible under common ownership.
The incentive compatibility constraint for y is still given by (26) with the exception
that
 
F h;! + F l;!

is given by (52) : Since lower ypi relaxes this incentive compatibility
constraint, we set ypi to its minimum value. Substituting y
p
i = 0 in the critical discount
factor for y (equation (27)) we obtain
  P
d;!
h + P
d;!
l   S
P d;!h + P
d;!
l   P !h (y!h ; 0)  P !l (y!l ; 0)
=
G!
(l + h) y
: (56)
By Proposition 2 GJ < GC . Therefore joint ownership dominates common ownership
if   1=2: It can be shown that the same result holds also for  < 1=2:
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